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Venture capital is a type of private 
equity capital typically provided to 
early-stage, high-potential-growth 
companies that are not publicly traded. 
By providing funds, the venture 
capitalist hopes to eventually generate 
a return through an event such as 
an initial public offering (IPO) or 
sale to another company. A contract 
between a venture capitalist and an 
enture capital financing relies heavily on 
convertible securities; the most common 
type is convertible preferred stock. Venture 
capital contracts also specify control rights 
that describe who gets to make the firm’s decisions.  
The recent literature has provided some theoretical 
explanations for the use of these two features. Underlying 
these explanations is the idea that individuals can take 
actions that affect the firm’s performance but that these 
actions cannot be specified in a contract. In this article, 
Yaron Leitner focuses on venture capital contracts, but 
the ideas presented can be applied to other contracting 
problems in which individuals must be given incentives to 
take appropriate actions.
entrepreneur has many special features; 
for example, a venture capitalist 
typically provides capital in stages and 
can abandon the venture at any time. 
The venture capitalist provides not 
only capital but also advice on how to 
manage the venture.1 
Unlike debt, which characterizes 
most bank financing, venture capital 
financing relies on equity-like and 
convertible securities that provide 
the venture capitalist with a share 
of the profits (the upside). The most 
commonly used security is convertible 
preferred stock.2 Convertible preferred 
stocks were used in 204 of the 213 
real-world venture capital investment 
contracts analyzed by Steven Kaplan 
and Per Strömberg.3 Sometimes the 
convertible preferred stock was used 
in combination with other securities, 
but in 170 financing rounds (almost 80 
percent), convertible preferred stock 
was the only security used.
Real-world venture capital 
contracts also specify control rights 
that clearly describe who gets to make 
the firm’s decisions. These control 
rights often depend on the firm’s 
performance. The recent literature 
has provided some theoretical 
explanations for the extensive use of 
convertible preferred stocks in venture 
capital contracts and for the use of 
contingent control rights. Underlying 
these explanations is the idea that 
individuals (the entrepreneur and the 
venture capitalist) can take actions 
that affect the firm’s performance but 
that these actions cannot be specified 
explicitly in a contract. 
This article focuses on venture 
1 An excellent, accessible account of what 
venture capitalists do can be found in the 
Business Review article by Mitchell Berlin. An 
account of the history of venture capital can be 
found in the introduction to the book by Paul 
Gompers and Josh Lerner.
2 The government is now using this type of 
security to recapitalize banks under the Capital 
Assistance Program. For more details, see the 
regulatory agencies’ joint press release from 
February 23, 2009 at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20090223a.htm.
3 Their sample largely reflects financing rounds 
completed between 1996 and early 1999 
(166 cases). Of the remaining cases, 34 were 
completed between 1992 and 1995 and 13 were 
completed before 1992.   Business Review  Q3  2009   19 www.philadelphiafed.org
capital contracts, but the ideas 
presented here can be applied to 
other contracting problems in which 
individuals must be given incentives to 
take appropriate actions.
After explaining what a convert-
ible preferred stock is, we will describe 
some of the theoretical explanations 
and some empirical facts. 
WHAT IS A CONVERTIBLE 
SECURITY?
In exchange for putting money 
into a firm, a venture capitalist 
usually receives convertible preferred 
stocks. Because these are complicated 
securities, I will first explain what 
preferred stock is and then explain what 
convertible preferred stock is.
Preferred stock has some features 
that resemble debt, but legally, it is 
an equity security. As with a debt 
contract, the company needs to 
make fixed payments (dividends) to 
the holder of the preferred security. 
But unlike with debt, the company 
can choose not to pay the dividends 
without being considered in default of 
the contract.4 Preferred stock is called 
preferred because the company cannot 
pay dividends on its common stock 
unless it has paid them to preferred 
stockholders. Debt holders, however, 
must be paid before any preferred 
stockholder gets paid. Unlike preferred 
stockholders in many other settings, 
venture capitalists who hold preferred 
stock usually have voting rights. In 
addition, venture capitalists usually 
have a right of redemption, which 
means that they can cash out their 
shares at some predetermined price 
whenever they want to. 
Convertible preferred stocks are 
preferred stocks that give the holder 
the right (or option) to convert his or 
her shares into a pre-specified number 
of shares of common stock. Venture 
capitalists who hold convertible stock 
will exercise this option only if they 
expect to receive more money by doing 
so, for example, if the stock price is 
very high relative to the conversion 
price. Thus, convertible preferred stock 
provides venture capitalists with some 
protection if the business does not 
do well (in this case, the fact that it 
is preferred allows venture capitalists 
to take priority over common 
stockholders in payments) while the 
conversion feature allows them to 
share the upside.
A convertible bond is another 
example of a convertible security. 
This is a bond that can be converted 
into shares of common stock. While 
convertible bonds are sometimes 
used by other firms, they are not very 
common in venture capital finance.5 
(See Who Issues Convertible Securities?)
CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES 
CAN ALIGN INCENTIVES
Venture capitalists are usually 
very active in managing and providing 
advice to the firms they finance. 
The firm’s success depends on the 
venture capitalist’s effort as well as 
on the entrepreneur’s. Economists 
use “effort” to describe actions or 
decisions that involve time and work 
but that increase the probability 
of higher profits. For example, 
in a biotechnology start-up, the 
entrepreneur, who has scientific skills, 
puts effort into developing a new drug 
by reading scientific material and 
conducting laboratory experiments, 
while the venture capitalist, who has 
managerial skills, puts effort into 
marketing the drug by conducting 
market research to find out who is 
likely to use it. Clearly, earnings and 
profits depend not only on effort but 
also on some other factors that are 
beyond the firm’s control, such as 
overall economic conditions or what 
a competitor does. Nevertheless, the 
underlying assumption is that when 
one exerts more effort, the firm is more 
likely to generate more profits. The 
firm may still end up with low profits, 
but the chances for low profits are 
reduced when more effort is exerted.
Since exerting effort is costly, the 
entrepreneur and venture capitalist 
will do so only if they are provided 
with the right incentives. Ideally, this 
could be done via a contract that 
specifies the level of effort that each 
one should make and the punishment 
for shirking. For example, someone 
who does not exert the appropriate 
amount of effort should be paid less (or 
not be paid at all).
The problem with such a contract 
is that it is often impossible to observe 
or measure precisely how much effort 
someone exerts. For example, it may 
be hard to determine whether the 
scientist has used intelligence and 
creativity in developing the drug or 
Preferred stock has some features that
resemble debt, but legally, it is an
equity security. 
4 In addition, dividends received from preferred 
stock have different tax implications from 
interest collected on debt.
5 Convertible debt was used in only one out 
of the 213 cases that Kaplan and Strömberg 
analyzed. Convertible zero-coupon debt was 
used in eight cases. A zero-coupon debt is a 
bond that does not make periodic interest 
payments. It pays only the principal at the 
expiration date. A convertible zero-coupon debt 
is a zero-coupon debt that can be converted into 
shares of common stock.20   Q3  2009 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
Who Issues Convertible Securities?
T
homas Noddings, Susan Christoph, and John Noddings 
analyzed U.S. convertible bonds and U.S. convertible preferred 
stocks trading in January 2000.a Their data do not include 
firms that rely on venture capital financing, since those firms 
are not publicly traded. 
They found that companies that issue convertible bonds span a broad 
market spectrum from very small-cap to very large-cap firms, but the majority 
of issues represented micro-sized to small-sized growth companies with 
ratings below investment grade. A total of 311 companies had actively traded 
convertible bonds. Of these companies, 26 percent were in what the authors 
defined as the micro-cap category (market capitalization below $225 million), 
32 percent were in the small-cap category (market capitalization between $225 
million and $1.25 billion), 27 percent were in the medium-cap category (market 
capitalization ranging from $1.25 billion to $10.5 billion), and the remaining 15 
percent were large-cap companies (market capitalization above $10.5 billion).b 
Only 21 percent of the firms had a Standard & Poor’s bond rating of BBB and 
above.  Noddings, Christoph, and Noddings note that the 230 small-cap and 
larger companies (i.e., the small, medium, and large) were among the 3,000 
largest U.S. firms, and that while there was a slight overlap with the largest 
3,000 firms, most of the 81 micro-cap companies came from the 1,000 firms 
just below the top 3,000. This gives us some idea of the fraction of public firms 
with actively traded convertible bonds (roughly 8 percent).
Like convertible bonds, most convertible preferred stocks were issued by 
small to mid-sized companies. Out of the 117 companies with actively traded 
convertible preferred stocks, 15 percent were in the micro-cap category (defined 
above), 32 percent were small cap, 39 percent were medium cap, and 14 percent 
were large cap. Only 13 percent had a Standard & Poor’s preferred stock rating 
of BBB and above.
a The first edition of their book covers January 1998. Even though the numbers are not identical 
in both editions, the results are essentially the same.
b There are no precise definitions for small, medium, and large market cap. In addition, these 
definitions can change over time. I use the definitions in Noddings, Christoph, and Noddings’ 
study.
conducted the “right” experiments. 
Thus, a court may not be able to 
enforce the ideal contract described 
above. However, a court may be able 
to enforce a contract that depends 
on some observable outcomes, such 
as earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT). A contract between an 
entrepreneur and venture capitalist 
can therefore depend on EBIT, but it 
cannot depend on effort directly. 
The issue then is how to share 
the project’s earnings between 
the entrepreneur and the venture 
capitalist so that each one will have 
the incentive to put the appropriate 
amount of effort into the project. 
Intuitively, one will exert more effort 
when one has more at stake. If you are 
the sole owner of the firm and do not 
need to share the profits with anyone, 
you will exert as much effort as you 
can, up to the point at which the extra 
effort no longer increases profits (net 
of the cost of exerting effort). However, 
if you need to share the profits with 
someone else, you will be less willing to 
exert effort, and you will do so only up 
to the point at which the extra effort 
increases your share of the profits.
The optimal split of profits 
between the entrepreneur and the 
venture capitalist is the one that 
induces efforts that generate the 
highest total profits (net of the cost 
of putting forth effort). Suppose, for 
example, that the optimal split is 50-
50; that is, the entrepreneur and the 
venture capitalist each have 50 percent 
of common stock, giving each a claim 
on 50 percent of the firm’s profits. This 
is how the entrepreneur and venture 
capitalist would split the profits if 
there were no other issues involved. 
In other words, if providing incentives 
to exert effort is the only concern, we 
can induce the optimal level of effort 
by giving the entrepreneur and the 
venture capitalist shares of common 
stock according to the optimal split.
Another issue, however, is 
that venture capitalists need to be 
compensated not only for the effort 
they exert but also for the money 
they invest in the venture. Venture 
capitalists will agree to invest in the 
firm only if they expect to make a 
profit; more precisely, the expected 
return on the investment, adjusted 
for risk, needs to be at least as high 
as what the venture capitalists could 
obtain by investing their money 
elsewhere. If the investment is 
very large relative to the size of the 
company, a venture capitalist may 
insist on a split of, say, 60-40, where he   Business Review  Q3  2009   21 www.philadelphiafed.org
or she gets 60 percent of equity instead 
of only 50 percent. However, compared 
with the optimal split of 50-50 
assumed above, a 60-40 split distorts 
incentives, inducing the entrepreneur 
to exert too little effort. The use of 
convertible securities can help ensure 
that a venture capitalist gets enough 
cash to cover the initial investment 
while at the same time maintaining 
incentives. 
The idea is as follows: Suppose 
that profits can be either $100 million 
(good state) or $40 million (bad state), 
and the entrepreneur can either exert 
effort or not. The entrepreneur’s 
effort increases the likelihood of the 
good state and reduces the likelihood 
of the bad state. The entrepreneur 
will exert effort only if the payoff he 
receives in the good state is large 
enough compared to what he gets in 
the bad state. With a 50-50 split, the 
entrepreneur obtains $50 million in 
the good state and $20 million in the 
bad state, and as assumed here, this 
induces him to exert effort. However, 
we can also induce effort by giving 
the entrepreneur less in both states; for 
example, we can give the entrepreneur 
$30 million in the good state and 
nothing in the bad state. In this case, 
more is left to the venture capitalist, 
and the venture capitalist can cover 
his investment. This profit allocation 
can be implemented by giving the 
entrepreneur shares of common stock 
and by giving the venture capitalist 
shares of convertible preferred stock. 
The preferred stock ensures that 
the venture capitalist has priority 
in payment in the bad state (in our 
example, he receives everything), and 
the convertibility option allows the 
venture capitalist to share the upside. 
For more details, see An Example of 
Venture Capital Financing on pages 22 
and 23, as well as the table on page 24. 
The detailed numerical example 
illustrates two more things: First, 
the need for convertible preferred 
stock arises only when the required 
investment from the venture capitalist 
is large. Otherwise, the two objectives 
(inducing effort and allowing the 
venture capitalist to cover his 
investment) can be achieved by simply 
giving the venture capitalist shares of 
common stock, which is equivalent 
to simply sharing the profits of the 
firm. This seems consistent with the 
observation that “angel investors,” who 
invest smaller amounts than venture 
capitalists, are more likely to obtain 
common stock. See, for example, the 
paper by Andrew Wong.6 Second, in 
some cases (for example, when the 
required investment is very large and 
the entrepreneur has no funds of his 
own), we may not achieve the two 
objectives above even with convertible 
preferred stock. In this case, it might 
not be possible to finance the venture 
at all, or the entrepreneur might need 
to wait until he has amassed enough 
capital of his own.7
CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED 
STOCK CAN PREVENT 
WINDOW DRESSING
A striking feature of venture 
capital finance is that the venture 
capitalist typically infuses capital in 
stages, which are usually related to 
significant milestones in the develop-
ment process. Such stages, for example, 
might be completion of the design, the 
pilot production, the first date the firm 
makes a profit, or the introduction 
of a second product. At each stage, 
the firm is given just enough cash to 
reach the next stage, and the venture 
capitalist retains the option to aban-
don the venture if performance is not 
satisfactory.  
The threat to abandon the ven-
ture may induce the entrepreneur to 
put more effort into making the ven-
ture a success. This is good, of course, 
but it also introduces the potential for 
“window dressing.” The entrepreneur 
might manipulate short-term per-
formance signals upward to fool the 
venture capitalist into continuing to 
finance the project. For example, the 
entrepreneur might engage in activi-
ties that boost short-term earnings but 
reduce long-term earnings. Or the en-
trepreneur might produce a prototype 
that looks functional (and so meets the 
requirements of the current stage) but 
is in fact too costly to put into mass 
production. Window dressing reduces 
the benefit of stage financing because 
the venture capitalist bases decisions 
on “noisy” or incorrect information 
6 An angel investor is a high-net-worth 
individual who typically invests in small private 
firms, on his own account. (In contrast, venture 
capitalists invest funds received from other 
individuals.) Formally, angel investors are 
“accredited investors,” according to the SEC. 
The SEC rule 501 of Regulation D states that 
an accredited investor is an individual who 
has a net worth that exceeds $1 million or an 
expected yearly income of more than $200,000 
($300,000 including spouse).
7 For more detailed models, read the paper by 
Catherine Casamatta and the paper by Rafael 
Repullo and Javier Suarez.
A striking feature of venture capital 
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An Example of Venture Capital Financing
D
exter, a young genius, has finally 
decided to have his own start-up. He 
has an idea about how to develop a 
drug that allows cartoon characters to 
become humans and vice versa. Dexter 
has no cash of his own, and he hopes to raise the re-
quired investment of $45 million from his old neighbor, 
Mandark, who now has his own venture capital firm. 
Assume that there are two states: A good state, 
where profits are $100 million, and a bad state, where 
profits are $40 million. Dexter and Mandark can either 
exert effort or not. Exerting effort raises the probability 
of the good state and lowers the probability of the bad 
state: If both Dexter and Mandark exert effort, the 
probability of each state is 50 percent. If either of them 
does not exert effort, the probability of the good state 
falls to 25 percent, and the probability of the bad state 
rises to 75 percent.
But Dexter and Mandark bear a cost for exerting 
effort. Think of this as profits each forgoes by putting 
effort into the venture rather than into other projects. 
Assume that the cost of exerting effort (per individual) 
is $7.5 million. 
Let’s suppose that Dexter and Mandark share 
profits between them. The question is how to design a 
contract between Dexter (the entrepreneur) and Man-
dark (the venture capitalist) so that (i) each will have 
the incentive to exert effort (more precisely, we want to 
make sure that if one exerts effort, the other one can-
not gain by not exerting effort);a and (ii) Mandark (who 
supplies the funds) will at least break even.
Consider first an even split; that is, Dexter and 
Mandark write a contract according to which they split 
the profits equally, so that each one gets $20 million in 
the bad state and $50 million in the good state. Is this 
enough to induce effort? Yes. If Dexter exerts effort, 
Mandark cannot gain by not exerting effort. To see 
this, note that Mandark’s expected return from exert-
ing effort equals (0.50×20)+ (0.50×50) - 7.5=27.5, 
and his return from not exerting effort is the same 
((0.75×20)+(0.25×50)=27.5). Similarly, if Mandark 
exerts effort, Dexter cannot gain by not exerting effort.
The problem with this split is that Mandark does 
not receive enough to cover his initial investment of 
$45 million. Knowing this, Mandark will not invest to 
begin with.
We might think that the solution is to give Man-
dark a larger share of the project’s profits, so that he 
can cover his initial investment. The problem is that by 
reducing Dexter’s share, we eliminate his incentives to 
exert effort. For example, if Mandark gets 75 percent 
of the profits and Dexter gets 25 percent, Dexter ends 
up with $10 million in the bad state and $25 million in 
the good state, so he has no incentive to exert effort.  
(If he exerts effort, he obtains (0.50×10)+ (0.50×25) 
- 7.5=10; if he does not exert effort, he obtains 
(0.75×10)+ (0.25×25)=13.75.)
Instead, one solution is a contract that gives 
Dexter nothing in the bad state and $30 million in the 
good state, while giving Mandark $40 million in the 
a This is what economists refer to as a Nash equilibrium.
rather than on correct information. In 
extreme cases, the possibility of win-
dow dressing may cause the venture 
capitalist to decide not to finance the 
venture to begin with.
In their article, Francesca Cornelli 
and Oved Yosha show that properly 
designed convertible preferred equity 
can overcome window dressing. How 
can such a security resolve the prob-
lem? Cornelli and Yosha show that the 
convertibility option is the answer.
Cornelli and Yosha assume that 
the venture capitalist must choose 
whether to convert his preferred stock 
to common stock after he sees the 
results of the first financing stage 
but before he sees final profits. This 
means that the decision to convert 
must be based on the venture’s interim 
performance. The venture capitalist 
will choose to exercise the conversion 
options only if profits are likely to be 
high, based on the venture’s interim 
performance. Window dressing, 
because it makes interim performance 
look better, increases the likelihood 
that the venture capitalist will convert 
his or her preferred stock to common 
stock. But conversion is a very undesir-
able outcome for the entrepreneur. In 
particular, if the conversion price is 
set low, the venture capitalist obtains   Business Review  Q3  2009   23 www.philadelphiafed.org
An Example of Venture Capital Financing...continued
bad state and $70 million in the good state.b This is 
feasible because Mandark expects to get $55 million, 
on average, which is more than his initial investment 
plus his effort cost.c It also induces both Dexter and 
Mandark to exert effort (as shown in possibility 3 in the 
table).
This last contract is more than pure profit shar-
ing, since Dexter receives a positive share of the profits 
in the good state, but nothing in the bad state, even 
though the project generates $40 million. Such a 
contract can be implemented by giving Dexter shares 
of common stock and by giving Mandark shares of 
convertible preferred stock. Specifically, Dexter gets 30 
shares of common stock, and Mandark gets 70 shares 
of convertible preferred stock that has a total promised 
payment of $40 million (if not converted) and that can 
be converted into 70 shares of common stock. If the 
bad state happens, Mandark will not exercise the op-
tion to convert and will obtain the promised payment 
of $40 million, which is everything the firm has. If 
instead Mandark chose to convert the preferred shares, 
he would obtain only 70 percent of the profits (because 
he has 70 shares and Dexter has 30), which is less than 
$40 million. In contrast, if the good state happens, 
Mandark will exercise the conversion option and, by 
doing so, obtain $70 million (since he will then own 70 
percent of the firm’s shares, and the firm is worth $100 
million as a whole). This is clearly better than not con-
verting and receiving $40 million instead. (The table 
provides a summary.)
Finally, note that if Mandark needs to invest $27.5 
million or less, the two objectives (inducing effort 
and allowing Mandark to cover his investment) can 
be achieved even with an equal share (first possibility 
in the table). In contrast, if Mandark needs to invest 
more than $47.5 million, even the use of convertible 
preferred stock (third possibility in the table) does not 
achieve the two goals.
many shares of stock by choosing to 
convert preferred stock to common 
stock, and the entrepreneur ends up 
owning a substantially smaller portion 
of the venture. To prevent this from 
happening, the entrepreneur will not 
engage in window dressing in the first 
place.
Putting it differently, the 
entrepreneur faces a tradeoff: Window 
dressing increases the probability 
that the venture will continue to 
be financed but also increases the 
probability that the venture capitalist 
will use the conversion option to 
acquire a substantial portion of the 
firm’s equity. Setting the conversion 
price low makes the second scenario, 
in which the venture capitalist uses the 
conversion option, very undesirable for 
the entrepreneur, and this induces the 
entrepreneur to refrain from window 
dressing in the first place.8 
CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES 
AND EXIT DECISIONS
Now let’s consider the exit 
decision and the contract between 
the venture capitalist and the 
entrepreneur. The exit decision refers 
to the terms on which the venture 
capitalist can cash out his or her 
investment, pay the investors, and 
move on to the next prospect. A 
moderately successful investment 
usually leads to a sale to another firm, 
while an exceptionally successful 
investment leads to an initial public 
offering (IPO), in which the firm 
issues common stock to the general 
public. For example, Apple, Google, 
Intel, Microsoft, and Yahoo, which are 
b This is not the only possibility. For example, giving Dexter $1 million in the low state and $31 million in the high state, while giving Mandark $39 
million and $69 million, can also work.
c To simplify, I assumed here that the discount rate (i.e., the expected return Mandark can obtain by investing his money in other ventures with 
similar risk) is 0 percent. With a positive discount rate, Mandark would need to get more. For example, if the discount rate is 5 percent, Mandark 
would require an expected payoff of $54.75 million (= (45×1.05) + 7.5). The solution presented in this example still works in this case.
8 The assumption that the venture capitalist 
must decide whether to exercise the conversion 
option after seeing the results of the first stage 
but before seeing the final results (i.e., before 
learning about the long-term performance of 
the venture) is crucial. Otherwise, the venture 
capitalist will not convert upon seeing a good 
interim signal and instead will wait to obtain 
more precise information. This is a drawback 
of the model because in reality convertible 
preferred stock typically does not have such 
a pre-specified deadline for conversion. The 
venture capitalist usually converts only upon 
exiting the investment, i.e., when the venture 
is sold to an acquirer or when the venture goes 
public in an initial public offering.24   Q3  2009 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
TABLE
An Example of Venture Capital Financing
Possibility  1  Possibility 2   Possibility 3 
Total profits
Good     Bad       On
state  state  average*   
1 0 0    4 0    7 0                    
Good     Bad       On
state  state  average*     
1 0 0    4 0    7 0      
Good     Bad       On
state  state  average*     
100  40   70     
Dexter’s payoff       
Mandark’s payoff
  5 0    2 0    3 5
  5 0    2 0    3 5
  2 5    1 0       1 7 . 5
  75   30   52.5
  3 0     0    1 5    
  7 0   4 0    5 5  
On average, does 
Mandark cover his initial 
investment plus the cost 
of effort?*
No     
(35 < 45 +7.5)
Yes 
 (52.5 = 45 +7.5)
Yes   
(55 > 45 + 7.5)
If Mandark exerts effort, 
can Dexter gain by not 
exerting effort?
No  
If Dexter exerts effort, he 
receives 35-7.5 = 27.5.
Otherwise, he receives 
(0.25×50) + (0.75×20) 
=27.5.
Yes
If Dexter exerts effort, he 
receives 17.5-7.5 = 10.
Otherwise, he receives 
(0.25×25) + (0.75×10) 
=13.75.
No 
If Dexter exerts effort, he 
receives 15-7.5 = 7.5.
Otherwise, he receives 
(0.25×30) + (0.75×0) =7.5.
If Dexter exerts effort, 
can Mandark gain by not 
exerting effort?
No
If Mandark exerts effort, he 
receives 35-7.5 = 27.5.
Otherwise, he receives 
(0.25×50) + (0.75×20) 
=27.5.
No
If Mandark exerts effort, he 
receives 52.5-7.5 = 45
Otherwise, he receives 
(0.25×75) + (0.75×30) 
=41.25.
No   
If Mandark exerts effort, he 
receives 55-7.5 = 47.5.
Otherwise, he receives 
(0.25×70) + (0.75×40) 
=47.5.
Implementation Dexter and Mandark each 
get 50 shares of common 
stock.
Dexter gets 25 shares 
of common stock, and 
Mandark gets 75 shares of 
common stock.
Dexter gets 30 shares 
of common stock, and 
Mandark gets 70 shares of 
convertible preferred stock, 
which can be converted into 
70 shares of common stock, 
and which have a total 
promised payment of $40 
million.
*If both Dexter and Mandark exert effort
The table illustrates three ways to split profits between Dexter (the entrepreneur) and Mandark (the venture capitalist). Total profits are either $100 
million (good state) or $40 million (bad state). If both Dexter and Mandark exert effort, the probability of each state is 50 percent. If either of them 
does not exert effort, the probability of the good state falls to 25 percent and the probability of the bad state rises to 75 percent. The cost of effort 
is $7.5 million per individual. Mandark needs to cover his initial investment of $45 million plus the cost of effort. In addition, both Mandark and 
Dexter must be induced to exert effort. For simplicity, the discount rate is assumed to be 0 percent. The table shows that possibility 3 achieves the 
two goals, but possibilities 1 and 2 violate one of them. All numbers represent millions of dollars.  Business Review  Q3  2009   25 www.philadelphiafed.org
9 The convertible preferred shares currently 
being used to recapitalize banks also have a 
mandatory conversion feature.
10 In the survey by William Sahlman, 34.5 
percent of the capital invested resulted in a loss 
(11.5 percent resulted in total loss, and 23.0 
percent resulted in partial loss). The data he 
used covered investments by 13 venture-capital 
partnerships in 383 companies from 1969 to 
1985.
11 Note that we are dealing here only with 
the efforts that must be exerted after the 
exit decision has been made. In his article, 
Hellmann also deals with the effort that 
must be made in the first stage before the exit 
decision is made.
12 In the first numerical example in this article, 
there was more than one way to induce optimal 
levels of efforts because we could decide how 
to split profits in the high state as well as in 
the low state. Here if the venture remains 
independent there are also two states (failure, 
success), but because there are no profits if the 
venture fails, we can only split profits if the 
venture has an IPO. The only way to do it and 
maintain the optimal level of effort is equal 
shares. 
A moderately successful investment usually 
                                         
exceptionally successful investment leads to 
                                                   
issues common stock to the general public.
now publicly traded, initially received 
venture capital. 
The two types of exit decisions 
create new contracting opportuni-
ties for the venture capitalist and the 
entrepreneur: They can now allocate 
profits differently, depending on 
whether the firm is sold to another 
firm or goes public. This additional 
flexibility can make it easier to achieve 
the two objectives: providing incen-
tives to exert effort and making sure 
that the venture capitalist breaks 
even. Indeed, real world contracts 
often incorporate the exit decision. In 
many cases, the convertible preferred 
stock automatically converts to com-
mon stock in an IPO, but it does not 
automatically convert when the firm 
is purchased by another firm; Kaplan 
and Strömberg show that an automatic 
conversion provision was present in 95 
percent of the financing rounds they 
studied. In almost all cases, automatic 
conversion was related to an IPO.9
Thomas Hellmann provides a 
model that explains this automatic 
conversion clause. In his model, the 
entrepreneur and the venture capital-
ist learn about the potential profit-
ability of the venture. Then they need 
to make an exit decision. They can 
either sell the venture to an acquirer 
or remain independent, hoping to go 
public (in an IPO) later. Remaining 
independent is risky: The venture can 
succeed and obtain a high IPO price 
(the IPO value for existing sharehold-
ers could be $1 billion), but it can also 
fail and yield no profits.10 In contrast, 
if the venture is sold, say, at $600 
million, the venture capitalist and the 
entrepreneur end up with a guaranteed 
payoff that is high but not as high as 
what they would get if they remained 
independent and the venture turned 
out to be a huge success. 
The two types of exit decisions 
have very different implications for 
continuing effort by the venture 
capitalist and the entrepreneur 
(i.e., the effort they need to exert 
after learning about the potential 
profitability of the venture and making 
an exit decision). If the venture 
remains independent, the entrepreneur 
and the venture capitalist need to 
exert effort in order to increase the 
probability of a success before going 
public. However, if the venture is sold, 
their efforts are no longer needed. 
Thus, a contract must provide the 
entrepreneur and venture capitalist 
with incentives to exert effort only if 
the venture remains independent but 
not if it is acquired by another firm.11 
Remember that the contract also 
needs to make sure that the venture 
capitalist is compensated for his or 
her initial investment. In the example 
above, we showed that this can be 
done by giving the venture capitalist 
convertible preferred stock. But we 
also showed that when the required 
investment by the venture capitalist 
is very large, we could not achieve 
the two objectives simultaneously. 
(The problem was that if we gave the 
venture capitalist a big enough share 
of the profits to cover his investment, 
we hurt the entrepreneur’s incentives 
to exert effort.) Contracting on the 
exit decision can help us achieve the 
two objectives. In particular, we can 
give the venture capitalist a higher 
share of profits only if the firm is sold 
to another firm (in which case the 
entrepreneur’s effort is not important), 
while maintaining the optimal split of 
profits (inducing both to exert effort) if 
the venture remains independent. For 
example, if the firm is sold to another 
firm, the venture capitalist can obtain 
everything ($600 million), whereas 
if the firm remains independent, the 
venture capitalist and the entrepreneur 
can split profits equally to induce 
optimal effort levels.12 
Note that in the profit allocation 
above, the venture capitalist receives 
more if the value is realized through 
an acquisition rather than an IPO. 26   Q3  2009 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
Control rights are 
important because 
the entrepreneur and 
the venture capitalist, 
who hold different 
securities, may have 
different preferences 
regarding the exit 
decision to be made. 
He or she obtains $600 million in 
the first case but only $500 million 
(which is half of the IPO value) in the 
second case. This is done to increase 
the amount of money that the venture 
capitalist obtains as much as possible 
(so that he or she is willing to put out 
more money upfront) while at the 
same time inducing the entrepreneur 
and venture capitalist to exert the 
optimal level of effort needed for a 
successful IPO.13 This allocation of 
profits can be achieved by giving the 
entrepreneur 50 shares of stock and 
giving the venture capitalist 50 shares 
of convertible preferred stock that 
have a total promised payment of $600 
million and that can be converted into 
50 shares of common stock. For this to 
work the convertible preferred stock 
must have an automatic conversion 
clause. Otherwise, the venture 
capitalist will not convert the preferred 
stock voluntarily when the firm makes 
an IPO.14
CONTROL RIGHTS
The discussion so far has been 
about cash flow rights: i.e., who has 
the right to obtain the venture’s 
profits? Hellmann’s model provides 
insights not only about cash flow rights 
but also about control rights; i.e., who 
gets to make the venture’s decisions? 
In particular, Hellmann focuses on the 
exit decision, showing that the firm’s 
performance determines who gets to 
make the exit decision. According to 
his model, the entrepreneur should 
obtain control when the potential 
profitability of the venture is high, 
and the venture capitalist should 
obtain control otherwise. This is 
consistent with the empirical evidence 
presented in the article by Kaplan 
and Strömberg. For example, they 
show that the venture capitalist may 
contractually obtain control from the 
entrepreneur when EBIT falls below a 
mutually agreed upon amount.15 
Control rights are important 
because the entrepreneur and the 
venture capitalist, who hold different 
securities, may have different 
perferences regarding the exit decision 
to be made. We have already seen 
that given the profit allocation in the 
previous section, the venture capitalist 
always prefers to sell the firm rather 
than have an IPO. However, this may 
not be the right decision from the 
firm’s point of view (it may not be the 
decision that maximizes total profits). 
For example, if the probability of a 
successful IPO is 70 percent, it is better 
to remain independent and attempt 
a successful IPO because 0.7 × $1 
billion is greater than $600 million. 
The entrepreneur will be happy with 
this decision (as he or she receives 
nothing if the firm is sold, but $500 
million if the IPO is successful), but 
the venture capitalist will not. 
But this does not mean that 
we should give the entrepreneur 
full control. In particular, suppose 
the entrepreneur and the venture 
capitalist learn that the probability of 
a successful IPO is only 50 percent. 
The right decision in this case is to 
sell the firm because $600 million > 
0.5×$1 billion. The venture capitalist 
gets paid $600 million and so will be 
happy with this decision. However, 
the entrepreneur will prefer to take 
13 The fact that the venture capitalist receives 
more in an acquisition compared to an IPO is 
counterfactual. However, it is not necessary 
for the main idea to hold. To see why, consider 
the case in which we don’t know exactly at 
what price the firm will be sold, and we want 
the venture capitalist to obtain $300 million 
plus 50 percent of the remaining sale profits 
(so the entrepreneur gets the other half of the 
remaining profits). For example, if the firm is 
sold for $600 million, the venture capitalist gets 
$450 million, and the entrepreneur gets $150 
million. This can be implemented by giving 
participating preferred stock to the venture 
capitalist (as explained in the next footnote) 
that automatically converts to common stock 
in an IPO. Automatic conversion is necessary 
because without it, the venture capitalist 
would get $300 million plus 50 percent of the 
remaining $700 million, which is more than 
$500 million, so he will not want to convert. 
14 If the venture capitalist converts preferred 
stock to common stock, he or she ends up with 
$500 million because the venture capitalist 
and the entrepreneur each have 50 shares of 
stock. If the venture capitalist does not convert 
preferred stock to common stock, he or she 
ends up with $600 million, but this does not 
implement the profit allocation wanted. In the 
real world, there is an extensive use of a variant 
of convertible preferred stock called participating 
preferred. This type of security was used in 38.5 
percent of the cases in the sample of Kaplan 
and Strömberg. Participating preferred stock 
can be thought of as a position of two securities: 
preferred stock and straight common stock. 
Upon exit, the holder of the participating 
preferred stock (the venture capitalist) obtains 
the promised dividend (just like preferred 
equity) but also obtains dividends as if the 
security had been converted to common stock. 
The venture capitalist will never want to 
convert his or her security to common stock; 
a venture capitalist who does so gives up the 
preferred stock and ends up with only common 
stock. Automatic conversion is therefore 
necessary.
15 They also showed that a state-contingent 
board provision (i.e., the venture capitalist 
gets control of the board in the bad state) 
was present in 18 percent of the cases in their 
sample and that state-contingent voting rights 
(i.e., the percentage of votes that investors and 
management have to affect corporate decisions) 
were present in 18 percent of all financing 
rounds and 25 percent of first financing rounds.  Business Review  Q3  2009   27 www.philadelphiafed.org
REFERENCES
the risk of remaining independent. If 
they sell the firm, the entrepreneur 
gets nothing, whereas if they remain 
independent and the venture succeeds, 
he or she can get $500 million. 
So how can we make sure that the 
right decision is made? In the example 
above, the entrepreneur should 
obtain control if the probability of a 
successful IPO is high (70 percent), 
and the venture capitalist should 
obtain control if the probability of a 
successful IPO is low (50 percent). 
More generally, the entrepreneur 
should obtain control if the expected 
proceeds from an IPO are high (either 
because of a high probability of success 
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such contingent control rights can be 
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in the contract that the venture 
capitalist obtains control if EBIT falls 
below some pre-specified level, which 
might indicate a low probability of a 
successful IPO. 
SUMMARY
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are widely used in venture capital 
financing. Convertible securities can 
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the entrepreneur and the venture 
capitalist exert the appropriate levels of 
effort to ensure the business’s success. 
Convertible securities can also prevent 
window dressing, so that the venture 
capitalist can provide financing in 
stages based on performance without 
worrying that the entrepreneur will try 
to make things look better than they 
really are. 
The convertible securities used 
in venture capital financing have 
many unique features. For example, 
an automatic conversion when the 
firm makes an IPO can increase the 
amount of money the entrepreneur 
can raise from the venture 
capitalist without compromising the 
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